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Aristotle of Stagira, to whom we owe the Topics (Aristotle
1976), recently supplemented this voluminous treatise by
publishing On Sophistical Refutations, which might have
been included as the earlier treatise’s ninth chapter, but has
now appeared as a small independent work dealing with
fallacies. Indeed, the reader of the Topics, who—by ref-
erences at the beginning of that treatise—may have been
tantalized to hear something on that very topic and become
more and more frustrated as he turned the pages, will
welcome a systematic exposition of that subject, which this
new volume now happily provides.
The author’s approach falls in with a current trend in
argumentation theory that stresses the importance of
studying argumentation and fallacies with reference to
particular institutionalized contexts. As in the Topics, the
context the author has in view is that of the Athenian
Academic Debate (Discussion, Dialogue), which makes the
book somewhat restricted in scope. However, much of
what he has to say can be extrapolated or adapted to other
contexts of discussion.
Even though the dialectical procedures of Athenian
Academic Debates may be familiar to many (Moraux 1968;
Slomkowski 1997), it will be useful to start by providing a
short outline of them. Next, I shall summarize the contents
of Aristotle’s new book and after that discuss his theory of
fallacies. The review ends with a discussion of a number of
topics that illustrate both the difficulty and the inspirational
value of the book.
1 The Dialectical Procedure
In an Athenian Academic Debate (henceforth: debate) there
are two participants, each of whom has a different role to play:
the Questioner (Arguer) and the Answerer (Respondent).
There may also be an audience. In what may be called ‘‘the
opening stage’’ of the debate, it is determined what the debate
will be about. The Questioner proposes a problem for dis-
cussion by putting forward a propositional question (i.e., a
question offering a choice between two contradictory propo-
sitions, such as ‘Is the universe infinite or not?’); the Answerer
selects either the positive or the negative answer as his thesis.
The contradictory of the Answerer’s thesis is the thesis of the
Questioner.
The primary aim of the Questioner is to refute the
Answerer’s thesis by a deductive argument that consists of
premises and a conclusion, the latter being identical to his
own thesis. In order to do so, the Questioner must first
obtain premises from which he may deduce his thesis.
These premises, too, are to be put forward as propositional
questions (formulated in a slightly different way, such as
‘Did the universe come into being?’). The Answerer must
then answer positively or negatively—and thus either way
grant a premise—or ask for a clarification of the question
or object to the question in some way.
Notice that it is not upon the Answerer to defend his
thesis by argument: only the Questioner is to defend his.
The aim of the Answerer is to uphold his thesis, i.e. to
avoid being refuted. However, the Answerer cannot do so
by simply refusing to grant any proposition. For, generally,
refusing to grant acceptable (reputable, plausible) propo-
sitions, such as the principles of the types of arguments
Aristotle discussed in the Topics, would make the
Answerer appear silly in the eye of the audience (as would
of course their outright denials).
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Sometimes considerations of acceptability and pressure
from the audience will be enough to make the Answerer
willing to concede a certain premise, but often it is nec-
essary to argue for a premise. Since the argument for a
premise may be again deductive, it may be necessary to
argue for premises needed for establishing a premise of the
ultimate deduction of the Questioner’s thesis. This makes
the dialectical procedure of debate recursive. But not all
arguments of which the Questioner may avail himself are
deductive. It is also possible to argue for premises in a non-
deductive way: induction can be used to get a universal
premise admitted and reasoning based on likeness to go
directly from case to case, skipping the establishment of
the universal.
After having obtained the premises of his ultimate
deduction, the Questioner proceeds to deduce his conclu-
sion. He then claims to have refuted the thesis of the
Answerer by having deduced its contradictory. To this the
Answerer may still object by trying to show either that the
alleged deduction contains a fallacy or that the conclusion
reached is not really the contradictory of his thesis.
2 Contents of On Sophistical Refutations
The book contains 34 chapters, but naturally falls in two
parts: chapters concerned with tactics for the Questioner
(3–8 and 12–15) and chapters concerned with tactics for
the Answerer (16–32). Besides, there is an introduction
(1–2), an interlude (9–11), and a conclusion (33–34).
Chapter 1 deals with appearance and reality in deductive
reasoning (sullogismos) and refutation (elengchos). The
definition of a (correct) deductive argument from the
Topics is repeated: In a truly deductive argument, not only
must the premises necessitate the conclusion, but also none
of them may be superfluous and all of them must be dif-
ferent from the conclusion (Topics I.1, 100a25–27 and SE1
1, 164b27–165a2). A refutation is just a deductive argu-
ment that concludes to the contradictory of some thesis.
Some arguments, however, are not really deductive argu-
ments or refutations, but only seem to be so. Sophists make
use of them to seem to have expertise they do not really
have. Such ‘‘sophistical’’ arguments and refutations are
fallacious and constitute the primary subject of the book
(which all sophists should read).
Chapter 2 distinguishes four kinds of arguments:
didactical, dialectical, examinational, and polemical argu-
ments. Polemical (eristical, contentious) arguments are
defined as ‘‘arguments that starting from opinions that
seem but are not really acceptable deduce or seem to
deduce their conclusion’’ (165b7–8). It is unclear why the
author does not include among the polemical arguments
those arguments that from truly acceptable premises
merely seem to deduce their conclusion (as he did in Topics
I.1, 100b23–25). But anyhow the subject of the book
includes polemical arguments that correctly deduce their
conclusion from premises that merely seem to be
acceptable.
The part about tactics for the Questioner starts in
Chapter 3 by listing the five aims of the polemists. In order
of preference, a polemical Questioner wants to succeed
(either truly or seemingly) in refuting the Answerer, in
showing his answer to be false, in leading him on to an
unacceptable answer, in letting him make a linguistic
blunder, or in bringing him to a state of ‘‘babbling’’, i.e.
forcing him to repeat the same phrase over and over again
when providing a paraphrase. The next chapters treat all
these and yet other tactics for the Questioner.
In Chapter 4, sophistical refutations are divided into two
groups: those that depend on the ‘‘use of language’’ (lexis)
and those that do not. Distinctive for the first group seems
to be that their deceptive character is due to matters of
formulation. It can be shown by experience and by theory
that there are exactly six kinds of sophistical refutations
that belong to this group: equivocation, amphiboly, com-
bination of words, division of words, accent, and form of
expression; these are illustrated by examples. There are
seven kinds that do not depend on the way language is
used: accident, secundum quid (omission or addition of
qualifications), ignoratio elenchi (ignorance of refutation),
petitio principii (begging the question), consequence, non
causa (wrong ground), and making one question out of
two. Examples of these (except petitio principii) are given
in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 Aristotle tries to show that all
these types of sophistical refutation can be reduced to
subtypes of ignoratio elenchi. In Chapter 7 he discusses the
causes of our being deceived by such fallacies. Mostly they
are a matter of resemblance or slightness of difference
between what is incorrect and what would be correct.
Chapter 8 deals with false refutations that, though correct
in themselves, are all the same to be called ‘‘sophistical,’’
because of the use of an unacceptable premise. In this
chapter Aristotle also claims that his list of types of
sophistical refutation is complete (SE 8, 170a9–11).
In the interlude, Aristotle stresses the non-specialist
character of dialectic. Each scientific discipline must deal
with the fallacies peculiar to it, whereas it is the task of the
dialectician to study fallacies in arguments that depend on
general principles and are not peculiar to any discipline, i.e.
the fallacies on Aristotle’s list (Chapter 9). Aristotle rejects
the idea that arguments can be classified as either directed
at someone’s words (literal meaning) or at someone’s
thoughts (mental meaning). Distinctions of meaning must
be made within the discussion rather than be presupposed1 ‘‘SE’’ stands for ‘‘Sophistici Elenchi’’ (Sophistical Refutations).
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by it (Chapter 10). In Chapter 11 he continues the discus-
sion of the contrast between dialectic and the scientific
disciplines. False proofs within a science (i.e. based upon
its principles and conclusions) are fallacious, but not
polemical, whereas merely apparent deductions and
deductions from premises that merely appear to belong to
the science in question are polemical.
In Chapter 12, Aristotle resumes the discussion of tactics
for the Questioner. This chapter deals with ways to get a
falsehood or unacceptable premise conceded (the second
and third aim of the polemist, mentioned in Chapter 3). In
Chapter 13, he gives examples of circular paraphrases that
can provoke a state of babbling (the fifth aim of the pole-
mist). For instance, if it has been admitted that ‘‘double is
double of half,’’ it must also be admitted that ‘‘double is
double of half of half’’ and that ‘‘double is double of half of
half of half’’ and so on. In Chapter 14, he discusses ways to
let the Answerer make a linguistic blunder (the fourth aim);
obviously, such tactics depend very much on the particular
language used in the debate. In Chapter 15, he concludes
the part about tactics for the Questioner discussing a
number of ways to strategically arrange one’s questions,
especially with a view to the hiding of one’s purpose
(krupsis, a subject he also discussed in Topics VIII.1,
155b26–157a5).
The part about tactics for the Answerer is introduced in
Chapter 16. How must the Answerer react to the Ques-
tioner’s various tactics? This study, says Aristotle, is useful
for philosophy because it will sharpen our semantic insight
(needed to make distinctions in a reaction to fallacies that
depend on the use of language) and because it helps us
avoid committing fallacies in our own research and also
because it will enhance our reputation as a debater.
Chapter 17 describes a number of ways to stand in the way
of a polemist’s real or apparent success. For instance, one
should not hesitate to spot ambiguities and introduce dis-
tinctions, even if one does not yet see how the Questioner
could exploit the ambiguity. A particularly important kind
of defense, described in Chapter 18, is that of providing a
solution (lusis) to a ‘‘false’’ deduction (i.e., either an
argument that merely seems to be a deduction or a
deduction of a falsehood). To solve a false deduction, one
should pinpoint the (explicit or implicit) premise that is
responsible either for the illusion of there being a deduction
or for the deduction of a falsehood. In the case of an
argument that merely seems to be a deduction, one should
then make a distinction, whereas in the case of a deduction
of a falsehood one should demolish either the responsible
premise or the conclusion. Chapters 19–23 discuss the
solutions to sophistical refutations that depend on the use
of language, Chapters 24–30 those to sophistical refuta-
tions that do not depend on the use of language, Chapter 31
does so for the tactics of bringing the other to a state of
babbling, and Chapter 32 for that of letting the other make
a linguistic blunder. These chapters contain many more
examples.
As the book draws to an end, Chapter 33 discusses the
degree of incisiveness of arguments. Among the sophistical
arguments, those based on equivocation might be the sil-
liest (some fallacious arguments would fool no one),
whereas the most incisive are those that keep one in the
dark about whether they truly deduce their conclusion or
not: in that case one does not know which way to turn,
whether to demolish a premise or to make a distinction. In
Chapter 34, Aristotle presents a brief survey of the book
and looks back on his dialectical project as a whole.
3 Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacies
Among the most amazing claims in the book is the com-
pleteness claim in Chapter 8:
Thus we may know in how many ways fallacies come
about. For there can be no more ways; they all will
come about in the ways mentioned (SE 8, 170a9–11).
Obviously, by ‘‘fallacies’’ here the sophistical refutations
are meant and not fallacies in a wider sense, including false
proofs peculiar to scientific disciplines, which fall outside
the scope of dialectic. Even so the claim is amazing. Why
could there not be other types of sophistical refutation than
those that appear on Aristotle’s list? Unfortunately, Aris-
totle does not explain this in detail, but the core of his
completeness proof lies in the reduction of all fallacies to
ignoratio elenchi: each possible type of fallacy corresponds
to an omission of a part of the definition of ‘‘refutation.’’ If
an alleged refutation complies with all parts of the
definition, it cannot be fallacious. One may discern a
sketch of a first version of the completeness proof in
Chapter 6. However, the proof sketch that immediately
precedes the completeness claim, in Chapter 8, is based on
a more detailed definition of refutation. This definition,
which remains implicit, would, if spelled out, carefully list
the different tasks involved in the construction of a
refutation as stipulated by the relevant parts of the
dialectical procedure: (1) determining the Answerer’s
thesis, (2) asking questions and obtaining premises, (3)
deducing a conclusion from the premises, (4) comparing
the conclusion with the thesis of the Answerer. Analysis of
these tasks yields a list of all possible things that might go
wrong when constructing a refutation in an Athenian
Academic Debate. This list corresponds to Aristotle’s proof
sketch in Chapter 8, from which Aristotle’s list of
sophistical refutations can be obtained (minus ignoratio
elenchi, which is no longer on a par with the other kinds of
sophistical refutation). It must be noted, however, that not
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every single mistake in the construction of a refutation
counts as a fallacy: for this it is also needed that the
mistake easily escapes our notice, a matter Aristotle
discusses in Chapter 7.2
So Aristotle’s list is indeed complete! Though the way
this result has been achieved lies somewhat hidden in the
text and had to be extracted by analysis, it is still a
remarkable achievement. As such, it is a result that holds
only for the particular dialectical procedure of the Athenian
Academic Debate. But Aristotle’s method can be used to
obtain similar results for other communicative activity
types or types of dialogue: first establish how arguments
are to be constructed in dialogues of that type and then give
a survey of kinds of mistakes that might occur in an attempt
to construct an argument. Each fallacy must display such a
mistake and such a mistake is a fallacy if and only if the
mistake easily escapes our notice.
4 Through Asperities to the Stars
‘‘There is nothing like this anywhere in modern literature’’
(Hamblin 1970, p. 52). Primarily, On Sophistical Refuta-
tions is a book for logical self-defense (Johnson and Blair
1977), but it is also announced as a useful treatise for
sophists: they should study fallacies not to avoid them, but
rather to commit them when it suits their purposes (SE 1,
165a28–31). Indeed, the book is refreshingly uncommitted
to moral views about a dialectician’s giving advice to the
bona fide discussant and the polemist or sophist alike.
This may sound as if On Sophistical Refutations is a
kind of popular manual, but in fact it is a rather technical
book and, moreover, not an easy book to read. At many
places one would wish that the author had written less
tersely and explained his meaning in greater detail.
Sometimes there are even unannounced shifts in the use of
technical terms, as we saw in the case of ‘‘refutation,’’
where a more detailed definition was presupposed in
Chapter 8 than had been given in Chapter 1. A good editor
could have done a lot!
Yet the study of this work can be rewarding as it yields
all kinds of suggestions for the theory of argumentation.
Above we saw how Aristotle’s somewhat hidden method of
establishing completeness, once unearthed, rewards us with
a method that is of general application. Below, I shall
present a few other examples of matters that may at first
embarrass the reader, but may also inspire him.
4.1 Fallacies Dependent on the Use of Language
We saw that, at the beginning of Chapter 4, Aristotle
divides the sophistical refutations into two groups (those
depended upon the use of language and the other ones). He
never tells us what motivates this division. There is also no
definition of ‘‘use of language’’ (lexis). Yet he claims that
there are exactly six kinds of fallacies of the first kind and
that this can be proved (SE 4, 165b23–30). This may make
one wonder whether the distinction between the two groups
can be explained and whether the completeness proof for
the six kinds of the first group can be reconstructed. On the
first issue, Hamblin contributed his conjecture that ‘‘what
does distinguish the refutations dependent on language is
that they all arise from the fact that language is an
imperfect instrument for the expression of our thoughts: the
others could, in theory, arise even in a perfect language’’
(1970, p. 81). The reconstruction of the completeness proof
for the first group takes up a hint from Aristotle, who tells
us that equivocation, amphiboly, and form of expression
depend on ambiguity (ditton), whereas combination, divi-
sion, and accent depend on a lack of identity of expressions
(SE 6, 168a23–28). This prompts us to rethink our criteria
of identity for linguistic entities (Hasper 2009).
4.2 Form of Expression
The same passage in Chapter 6 may make one wonder why the
fallacy of form of expression has been thrown in with the other
two as depending on ambiguity. Rather than two legitimate
readings, examples of this fallacy display a legitimate and an
illegitimate reading, so that there is no ambiguity in the
ordinary sense. Consider the following example: ‘‘If someone
no longer has what he once had, he has lost it. Now, who lost
just one knucklebone, will no longer have ten knucklebones’’
(SE 22, 178a29–31). This succinctly adumbrated example
may be reconstructed as follows:
• If someone no longer has what he once had, do we say
that he has lost it?
• Yes, thus we may define what it means to lose
something.
• Suppose, John has ten knucklebones and loses just one
of them. In that case, wouldn’t John no longer have ten
knucklebones, whereas he once had them?
• Exactly.
• So, according to our definition, John would have lost
ten knucklebones?
• Certainly.
• But we supposed he lost just one of them!
• Good grief!
Normally, ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘it’’ in the premise ‘‘If someone no
longer has what he once had, he has lost it’’ are taken to
2 For more details about this view on the completeness claim, see
Hasper (2012) or the introduction by Hasper and Krabbe in
(Aristoteles 2012).
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refer to individual objects. The sophistical Questioner,
however, takes these words to refer to quantities. But that
reading is just wrong. If quantities are meant, the premise
should be formulated as ‘‘If someone no longer has as
much as he once had, he has lost as much’’, which no one
would concede. Therefore, even though such examples
display ambiguity in the sense of there being two readings,
this is not the ordinary ambiguity where there are two
legitimate readings (as in cases of equivocation or
amphiboly), and hence the fallacy of form of expression
is a non sequitur rather than a fallacy of ambiguity. But it
still is a fallacy dependent on the use of language, for an
ideal language would make it clear for each word to which
category (individuals, quantities, qualities, etc.) it refers
and thus rule out this fallacy from the start (for Aristotle on
categories, see the untimely review by Ludger Jansen in
this journal, 2007). Thus understood, the fallacy of form of
expression, which may at first seem a bit outlandish, can be
connected with the twentieth century discussion about
Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s distinction between the
apparent and the real logical form of a sentence and
Ryle’s concept of a systematically misleading expression
(Russell 1905; Wittgenstein 1922; Ryle 1932; Krabbe
1998).
4.3 Babbling
One of the more puzzling and technical issues is Aristotle’s
treatment of the tactics of bringing someone into a state of
babbling (Chapters 13 and 31). It may be hard to follow
Aristotle in the semantic details of his exposition, but the
issue is certainly worth further consideration. Take the case
of We are our brains (translation of the title of a book by
Dick Swaab 2010). If Swaab is identical with his brains, he
will be identical with the brains of Swaab, and therefore
identical with the brains of the brains of Swaab, and with
the brains of the brains of the brains of Swaab, and so on.
This is of course not a refutation of the thesis that we are
our brains, for one might accept all these consequences.
Yet, to have such ever more complex consequences may be
unwelcome and count as a drawback for the thesis that we
are our brains. It is a way of arguing against this thesis that
philosophers (rather than neurobiologists) will have to deal
with.
4.4 Peirastic
Whereas in Chapter 2 Aristotle distinguishes examinational
(peirastical) arguments from dialectical arguments, he
elsewhere usually takes peirastic—i.e. the examination of
(would-be) experts—to be a part of dialectic (SE 8,
169b25, SE 11, 171b4–5, 172a21, 35–36, but not in SE 34,
183a39–b1). Aristotelian peirastic is a kind of dialectic that
even non-experts can use as an instrument to unmask
would-be experts (SE 11, 172a21–24). It is the Academic
version of the Socratic examination dialogue, or ‘‘Socratic
peirastic’’ (Gentzler 1995). How does it work? Unfortu-
nately, Aristotle limits himself to only a few statements:
the non-expert can refute and thus expose the would-be
expert, without using any special knowledge in the field of
which the would-be expert claims to be an expert, by
means of common principles (koinoi), which are also
known to non-experts. As premises the non-expert must
obtain consequences (hepomena) of the principles of the
field in question that may be known also by a non-expert,
whereas an expert must necessarily know them (SE 11,
172a21–36). Peirastic is a very urgent topic for a demo-
cratic society, where people are supposed to govern, to pass
legislation, to judge cases in court, to participate in polit-
ical debates, or to vote, and to do so as non-experts in fields
that are relevant for their decisions. To make informed
decisions, non-experts must consult experts. Also the non-
experts must have means at their disposal to test the
trustworthiness of the experts. Here the expert examination
dialogue, a kind of dialectic, has a role to play (Walton
2006; Krabbe and van Laar 2010).
4.5 Solution
The concept of a solution to an argument is known from the
Topics. To solve an argument that (correctly) deduces a false
conclusion, one is to demolish a (false) premise: not just any
false premise, but the one on which the falsehood depends
(Topics VIII.10). As we saw, in On Sophistical Refutations the
concept of solution is extended to cover the case of a fallacious
deduction, in which case the solution consists of pinpointing
the culpable question and making a distinction (SE 18,
176b33–36). Generally, a solution is required to provide a
(presumably unique) theoretically grounded explanation of
how a fallacy or a false conclusion comes about; simply
showing up some flaw does not suffice (SE 24, 179b18,
23–24). Moreover, ‘‘for arguments that depend on the same
issue, the solution must be the same’’ (SE 20, 177b31–32) and
if the denial of the solution of an argument is added to the
premises the resulting argument must be unsolvable (SE 22,
178b16–21). Occasionally, however, more relaxed concep-
tions of solution intermingle: according to Chapter 18,
showing the conclusion to be false can be a solution without
pinpointing any particular premise (SE 18, 176b40) and
sometimes there may be more than one solution (SE 30,
181b19). Solutions according to such relaxed conceptions are
sometimes referred to as solutions ‘‘directed at the Questioner
and not at the argument’’ (SE 20, 177b33–34). The idea to
have a theory of fallacies that yields solutions in the stricter
sense is enticing, but needs further elaboration. Here Aristotle
left some work for us to take in hand.
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These examples may suffice to show that Aristotle’s
new book, though at points problematic, has a lot to offer to
inspire further research. Therefore, we should take a lenient
stance to the shortcomings of the author’s approach and be
most grateful for his achievements (SE 34, 184b6–8).3
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Aristote (1995) Les réfutations sophistiques. Translated, introduced,
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